Constraining the Samurai: Rebellion and Taxation in Early Modern Japan

On the eve of the Meiji Restoration in 1868, the nearly 300 semi-autonomous domains across Japan had widely varying tax rates. Some handed over 70 percent of their rice yield to the samurai ruler of the domain, while others provided 15 percent. This variation existed in spite of the similar fiscal demands that the domain rulers faced within the Tokugawa regime—the feudal system that governed Japan between 1603 and 1868. This period was remarkably stable; Japan saw no foreign or domestic wars. This allows us to focus on the impact of pressure from below on taxation. We study the extent to which peasant-led rebellions and collective desertion (“flight”) lowered the subsequent tax rate imposed by samurai rulers. Using newly compiled data on different types of peasant-led political mobilization—from petitions to insurrections—we find an association between, on the one hand, large-scale rebellions and flight and, on the other, lower tax rates. We interpret the results as evidence of rebellious or mobile peasants’ ability to constrain their rulers; the more complacent fail to win concessions. Our findings suggest that peasant mobilization played a role in restricting state growth in early modern Japan through tax concessions.1868年明治维新前夕，日本境内近300个半自治藩国的税率差异显著。部分藩国需将稻米总产量的70%上缴给本藩的武士统治者，另有部分藩国仅需上缴15%。尽管在1603年至1868年统治日本的德川封建政权（Tokugawa regime）下，各藩统治者所面临的财政需求大体相近，但这种税率差异依然存在。该时期社会秩序极为稳定，日本未发生任何对外或对内战争，这一背景使得我们得以聚焦于底层民众压力对税收政策的影响。本研究旨在探究农民主导的反抗运动与集体逃亡（即“逃匿”）在多大程度上降低了武士统治者后续制定的税率。我们通过新汇编的、涵盖从请愿到起义等各类农民主导的政治动员活动的数据，发现大规模反抗与逃匿行为，与更低的税率之间存在显著关联。我们将该研究结果解读为：具有反抗精神或流动性的农民具备制约其统治者的能力；而态度更为顺从的群体则无法获得税收减免。本研究结果表明，在近代早期日本，农民动员通过推动税收减免，对国家扩张起到了一定的制约作用。