Optimal Executive Compensation vs. Managerial Power: A Review of Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried's "Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation"

Name: Optimal Executive Compensation vs. Managerial Power: A Review of Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried's "Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation"
Creator: 美国国家经济研究局
Published: 2006-12-01T00:00:00+08:00

NBER2006-12-01 更新2025-01-04 收录

高管薪酬设计

公司治理

数据链接：

https://www.nber.org/papers/w12798 数据链接链接失效反馈

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资源简介：

This essay reviews Bebchuk and Fried's "Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation". Bebchuk and Fried criticize the standard view of executive compensation, in which executives negotiate contracts with shareholders that provide incentives that motivate them to

提供机构：

美国国家经济研究局

创建时间：

2006-12-01