Comparing the Use of Forward-Looking and Contemporary Performance Measurement to Formulate Incentive Contracts in the Presence of the Horizon Problem: An Experimental Analysis

This study compares the use of forward-looking and contemporary performance measurement in incentive contracts in the presence of the horizon problem. To do this, we used a single-factor experiment between pre- and post-treatment subjects, with a control group. The study had the participation of 76 undergraduate students, divided into 3 groups, and it registered that, when compared to the control group and the treatment group linked to contemporary performance measurement, the participants under the contract that rewarded having a forward-looking measurement as a basis acted more congruently with the long-term goal set for the experimental task. Consistent with predictions of the agency theory, the main finding of this research suggests that economic profit helps mitigating the problem of manage rial myopia, indicating that incorporate it to contracts motivates agents to act more consistently with the company's long-term goals, even in the presence of the horizon problem. Besides, the study registered new evidence of the inadequacy of formulating incentive contracts having distorted performance measurements as a basis, such as book profit.本研究针对存在期限视野问题（horizon problem）的场景下，前瞻性绩效衡量（forward-looking performance measurement）与当期绩效衡量（contemporary performance measurement）在激励契约（incentive contracts）中的应用展开对比分析。为此，我们采用了前测-后测受试者单因素实验设计，并设置对照组。本次实验共有76名本科生参与，被分为3组；实验结果显示，相较于对照组与采用当期绩效衡量的实验组，以前瞻性绩效衡量为奖励依据的契约下的参与者，其行为与实验任务设定的长期目标更为契合。与代理理论（agency theory）的预测一致，本研究的核心结论表明，经济利润（economic profit）有助于缓解管理层短视（managerial myopia）问题，这意味着将经济利润纳入激励契约，能够促使代理人的行为更贴合企业长期目标，即便在面临期限视野问题的情境下亦是如此。此外，本研究还提供了新的实证证据，表明以失真的绩效衡量指标（如账面利润（book profit））为依据制定激励契约存在不合理性。