Figure 1. Progressive Normalization Model for Infrastructure Targeting

This dataset presents Figure 1, “Progressive Normalization Model for Infrastructure Targeting,” derived from Nicolin Decker’s 2026 paper Systemic Financial Asymmetry and Nuclear Deterrence. The figure converts Table 12 into a ten-stage strategic-stability model explaining how infrastructure targeting may become operationally normalized without becoming legally permissible. The model distinguishes legal normalization from operational normalization. Civilian infrastructure remains protected under international humanitarian law, including distinction and object-specific military-objective analysis (UN Security Council records; ICRC Customary IHL, Rules 7–10). Recent conflict practice shows that infrastructure attacks may be justified as military necessity, self-defense, retaliation, or degradation of war-supporting functions, and may become reciprocal through repeated attack and counterattack (OHCHR and UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine). The model traces how target categories may expand from discrete military objects toward broader energy, transportation, communications, industrial, data, and financial systems. It also shows how diplomatic responses may become predictable through repeated concern, calls for restraint, and reaffirmations of civilian protection (U.S. Department of State, G7, and UN statements). Later stages examine doctrinal incorporation, strategic consequence, normative erosion, systemic vulnerability, and treaty-reconstitution pressure. State cyber, critical-infrastructure, and resilience materials show that infrastructure attack and defense are increasingly incorporated into doctrine, contingency planning, and resilience policy (U.S. State Department cyber strategy materials; DHS National Infrastructure Protection Plan 2013; CISA Financial Services Sector-Specific Plan). UN and OHCHR reporting further documents cascading civilian effects from infrastructure attacks, including harm to water, sanitation, heating, health care, education, economic activity, and civilian survival. The figure is intended for national-security, international-law, deterrence, infrastructure-resilience, and treaty-discussion contexts. Its central thesis is that civilian infrastructure has not become, and must not become, a lawful or acceptable general target category; repeated operational practice may weaken restraint before the law itself changes.本数据集呈现图1——"基础设施瞄准渐进式规范化模型（Progressive Normalization Model for Infrastructure Targeting）"，该模型源自尼科林·德克尔（Nicolin Decker）2026年发表的论文《系统性金融不对称与核威慑》（Systemic Financial Asymmetry and Nuclear Deterrence）。本图将表12转化为一个十阶段战略稳定模型，阐释基础设施瞄准行为如何在未获得法律许可的情况下实现操作层面的规范化。 该模型对法律层面规范化与操作层面规范化进行了区分。民用基础设施仍受国际人道主义法保护，其中包括区分原则与针对特定目标的军事必要性分析（联合国安全理事会记录；红十字国际委员会（International Committee of the Red Cross, ICRC）《习惯国际人道主义法》第7至10条规则）。近期冲突实践显示，基础设施攻击行为可被辩护为军事必要、自卫、报复或削弱敌方战争支撑能力的行动，且可通过反复攻击与反攻形成对等循环（联合国人权事务高级专员办事处（Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, OHCHR）及联合国乌克兰人权监测团相关记录）。 该模型梳理了目标类别如何从离散的军事目标，逐步扩展至更广泛的能源、交通、通信、工业、数据与金融系统。同时，该模型展示了外交回应如何通过反复表达关切、呼吁克制与重申民用基础设施保护原则变得可预测（美国国务院、七国集团（Group of Seven, G7）及联合国相关声明）。 模型的后续阶段则探讨了理论纳入、战略后果、规范侵蚀、系统性脆弱性以及条约重构压力等议题。各国关于网络空间、关键基础设施与韧性建设的相关文件显示，基础设施攻防行动正日益被纳入军事理论、应急规划与韧性政策框架（美国国务院网络空间战略文件；美国国土安全部（Department of Homeland Security, DHS）《2013年国家基础设施保护计划》；美国网络安全与基础设施安全局（Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, CISA）《金融服务行业专项计划》）。 联合国及联合国人权事务高级专员办事处的报告进一步记录了基础设施攻击带来的连锁民用影响，包括对供水、卫生、供暖、医疗、教育、经济活动及平民生存造成的损害。 本图适用于国家安全、国际法、威慑战略、基础设施韧性及条约磋商等相关场景。其核心论点为：民用基础设施尚未成为、且绝不应成为合法或可被接受的通用攻击目标类别；在法律本身发生变更之前，反复的操作实践可能会削弱各方的克制意愿。